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NOTES AND COMMENT
CONVICTION OF CRIME AS AFFECTING THE CREDIBILITY OF A WITNESS IN THE STATE OF WASHINGTON-COMPETENCY OF PERSONS
CONVICTED OF PERJURY TO TESTIFY IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PRO-

CEEDINGS-At common law persons convicted of heinous offenses
were not competent as witnesses.1 In order to be totally disqualified the witness must have been convicted of a crime making him
infamous. 2 The infamous crimes consisted of treason, felony, and
all forms of the crtmen fals. 3 Just what crtmen falsi includes is
not entirely clear, but generally it comprehends all crimes which
involve fraud or falsehood rendering the guilty party entirely
and injuriously affecting the administration of
untrustworthy,
4
justice.

The disqualification of a witness for infamy has been quite generally abolished by statute. In the state of Washington several
I GREENL. EV. sec. 572.
Pendock v. Mackinder Willes 665 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF EVIDENCE, III
p. 204.
I GREENL. EV. Sec. 373.
U. S. v. Yates, 6 Fed. 861 (1881) Utlcy v. Merrick, 11 Metc. (Mass.)
302 (1847)
2
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statutes have been passed regulating this question.
Stat., see. 1212, enacted in 1891, provides

Rein. Comp.

"No person offered as a -witness shall be excluded from
giving evidence by reason of conviction of crime, but such
conviction may be shown to affect his credibility Provided any person who shall have been convicted of perjury
shall not be a competent witness in any case unless the,
conviction has been reversed, or unless he shall have received a pardon."
Upon reading this section the question immediately arises as to
what crimes are meant by the statute, the conviction of which
may be shown to affect the credibility of the witness. A very
interesting situation has arisen in the state of Washington regarding the showing of convictions of crimes for the purpose of affecting the credibility of witnesses.
The decision in State v. Payne5 was rendered two years after
the enactment of Rem. Comp. Stat., see. 1212. In that ease the
conviction of petit larceny before a justice of the peace was offered
to affect the credibility of the witness. The court argued that
statutes similar to ours were passed to remove the common law disability rendering persons convicted of infamous crimes incompetent to testify, and that therefore only such crimes as before the
passage of these statutes, excluded witnesses from testifying on
account of infamy, can be shown to affect their credibility Furthermore, petit larceny being a misdemeanor, and not being an
infamous crime, the evidence should have been excluded.
It would seem that the decision in the Payne case was based upon
the fact that petit larceny is not considered as being a crime of the
grade crmen falst. If it would have been a crime of that nature,
the court would have probably held the evidence admissible.
In 1909 the criinnal code was adopted in this state. Rem. Comp.
Stat., see. 2290, is a part of this code, and provides.
"Every person convicted of crime shall be a competent
witness in any civil or criminal proceeding, but his conviction may be proved for the purpose of affecting the
weight of his testimony, either by the record thereof or
a copy of such record duly authenticated by the legal custodian thereof, or by other competent evidence, or by his
cross-examination upon which he shall answer any proper
question relevant to that inqiry and the party crossexamining shall not be bound by his answer thereto."
The decision in State v. Overland,6 rendered in 1912, is based
upon the foregoing section of the criminal code. In that case the
witness on cross-examination was compelled to admit prior con6 Wash. 563, 34 Pac. 317 (1893).
68 Wash. 566, 123 Pac. 1011 (1912).

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
viction of crime.

In the opinion the court used the following

language
"Whatever may have been the rule before the adoption
of the criminal code, it is now the law that a party accused
of a crime, offering himself as a witness, it may be shown
that he was previously convicted of crime. This is settled
by statute. Nor does see. 2290 retain the old distinction
between misdemeanors and felonies. A crime is an act
or omission forbidden by law, and punishable by death,
imprisonment, fine, or other penal discipline, and any
crime may be shown.'"
It will immediately be seen that this decision changes the rule
of the Payne case. The Overland case holds that any crime may
be shown to affect the credibility of the witness. The Payne case
allows only such crimes to be shown as at common law rendered
the witness infamous. The reasoning of the Overland case appears
to be that the, statutory definition of the word "crime" in the
criminal code of 1909 has a wider scope with respect to impeachment of witnesses than the word "crime" contained in section
1212, passed m 1891, in other words, that the common-law meaning of the word "crime" read into the original act, had been so
enlarged by the statutory definition of the word as to warrant a
different result.
It may be well to compare these two sections in order to see in
what respects they differ. See. 1212 provides that one convicted of
perjury shall be totally disqualified from testifying, whereas sec.
2290 makes no mention of this particular crime as disqualifying
the witness. See. 2290 provides that the conviction may be shown
by the record thereof, or by an authenticated copy thereof, or by
other competent evidence, or on cross-examination and the party
cross-examining shall not be concluded by his answer thereto. In
other words if the witness on cross-examination denies that he
has been convicted, the state may show by the record of the conviction that he was. Sec. 1212 does not include these provisions, and
the rule under this section was that the party cross-examing is
bound by the answer of the witness denying that he was ever convicted of a crime.8
In view of the fact that by construction in the Overland case
the court has held that sec. 2290, passed in 1909, has modified
sec. 1212, passed in 1891, with respect to the scope of the word
"crime," and in view of the further fact that sec. 2290 m express
terms abrogates the rule under 1212 as to proof of conviction in
the event of defendant's denial, it seems plain that portion of sec.
1212 retaining the common-law disqualification in the single case

State v. Turner 115 Wash. 170, 196 Pac. 638 (1921).
'State v. Payne, note 5, supra, State v. Gottfreedsonz, 24 Wash. 398. 64
Pac. 523 (1901)
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of perjury has also been repealed by the broad language of sec.
2290; in other words, that persons convicted of perjury have
since 1909 been competent to testify Tins seems apparent not
only from the clear language of see. 2290, which in terms applies
to both "civil" and "criminal" proceedings, a matter clearly
covered by the title to the act of 1909, 9 but the court has applied
the rule of see. 2290 in a civil proceeding.10 Moreover, New York,
whence our criminal code is largely derived,"' has judicially declared that the section which is the prototype of our see. 2290, has
removed the incompetency of convicted perjurers, in the following
language:
"Under the Revised Statutes (2 Rev. St. 681), a person
convicted of perjury was not permitted to be a witness in
any cause or matter, until his conviction was -reversed.
While this statute was in force, there was much reason,
certainly, in the construction that where a witness, by
his own confession on the stand, in presence of the jury,
admitted that he had willfully perjured himself on a
former occasion in respect to the same matter, his testimony ought to be wholly disregarded to the same extent
as though his perjury had been judicially established by
conviction. But now, by see. 714 of the Penal Code, no
conviction for crime disqualifies a witness, and the section expressly makes a person convicted of crime, not excepting perjury, a competent witness in any cause or
proceeding, civil or criminal, but allows the conviction to
be proved for the purpose of affecting the weight of his
testimony It would be manifestly absurd, in the light of
this statute, now to hold that an unconvicted perjurer
was an incompetent witness, whose evidence could not be
considered by the jury, when, under the statute, if he had
been convicted, his evidence must be received and weighed
by the jury In view of the present statute, whatever
doubts may have therefore existed, the true rule is that
stated by Judge Demo in Dunn v. People, 29 N. Y. 529,
9
The title to the criminal code of 1909 reads as follows: "An act relating to crimes and punishments and the rights and custody of persons
accused or convicted of crime, and repealing certain acts." This act re-

lates in part to "the rights

of persons

convicted of crime" and

plainly appears broad enough to cover the qualifications of witnesses in
civil actions, which section 2290 in express terms undertakes to cover.
".Marshall v. Dunn, 93 Wash. 156, 160 Pac. 298 (1916)
Section 2290 of Remington's Compiled Statutes is in words almost

identical with Chapter 41, section 2444 of Cahills Consolidated Laws of
New York (1923). The Washington Criminal Code of 1909 was modeled

after the criminal codes of New York and Minnesota. See references to New

York and Minnesota Codes in 1 Remington and Ballingers Annotated Codes
and Statutes of Washington (1910) commencing at section 2253. The

corresponding section in the Minnesota Code is Mason's Minnesota Statutes (1927), section 9948.
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and which was followed on the trial of this case-that
the testimony of a witness who has committed perjury m
the same matter on a prior occasion, whether the perjury
is established by a conviction or by his confession, or is
found by the jury, 'must be considered by the jury in
connection with the other evidence, under such prudential
instructions as may be given by the court, and subject
to the determination of the court having a jurisdiction to
grant new trials in cases of verdicts against evidence' ,12
This point, that that portion of see. 1212 rendering convicted
perjurers incompetent has been repealed by sec. 2290, was completely overlooked by the supreme court of Washington in the late
cases of State v. Carpenter, which was decided on the theory that
convicted perjurers are still incompetent as witnesses in this state.
The decision of the Overland case is now the law in this state,
as is shown by the deciisons rendered since that time. In State v.
Maloney' 4 the state asked the defendant in regard to his conviction
for a misdemeanor under the state liquor law The court held that
it was once the rule in this case, that the conviction of a misdemeanor could not be shown to affect the credibility of the witness,
but that rule has been abolished by Rem. Comp. Stat., see. 2290,
which allows the showing of either a felony or misdemeanor to
affect the credibility of the witnesss.
In State v Nichols"3 the prosecuting attorney cross-examined
the appellant as to a prior conviction for violation of a city ordinance. It was held that this may be done under the statute.
In the case of Marshall v. Dunn,6 evidence of the conviction of
Dunn in the police court of Spokane, for the violation of a city ordinance was offered. The court held that see. 2290 allows this. The
case of State v. Overland was cited in support of the court's conelusion. However the court in tle case of Marshall v. Dunn did
seem to consider it -very important, that the particular crime was
malum sn se.
In State v. Stone it was also held that the rule of the Payne case
is no longer in existence, as it was changed by the criminal code
of 1909.
"People v. O'Neil, 109 N. Y. 251, 16 N. E. 68 (1888), quoted in Irwin
v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 54 N. Y. S. 511, see also People v. Chaplea', 121
N. Y. 266, 24 N. E. 469 (1890)
A similar result has been reached, though perhaps more expressly, in
the federal law Rosen v. United States, 245 U. S. 467, 38 Sup. Ct. 148, 62
L. Ed. 406 (1918).
"3130 Wash. 23, 225 Pac. 654 (1924).
"135 Wash. 309, 237 Pac. 726 (1925)
'5121 Wash. 406, 209 Pac. 689 (1922).
"93 Wash. 156, 160 Pac. 298 (1916).
"66 Wash. 625, 120 Pac. 76 (1912)
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The foregoing decisions clearly indicate that it is now the rule in
the state of Washington, that prior conviction of any crime may
be shown to affect the credibility of the witness. The Overland case
defines a crime as an act or omission forbidden by law, and punishable by death, imprisonment, fine, or other penal discipline.'
This includes feloies, and misdemeanors, crimes malum in se, and
malum prohi-bita, and crimes of the crimen falss. In other words,
crimes of any nature may be shown.
In conclusion, it may be said that there is no objection to the
present rule except perhaps the fact that some crimes have no bearmg whatsoever on the veracity of a witness. An individual may
have been convicted of a crime, and yet may be an honest witness. For example, one may have been convicted for violation of
a parking ordinance. Minnesota, whose statute on this subject
was also a prototype 9 for our sec. 2290, has refused to permit
traffic convictions under city ordinances to be shown.20 It would
seem that a crime of this nature should not effect the veracity of
the person so convicted. Yet under the present rule in Washington, such a conviction could perhaps be shown to affect the crediELmER GOERING.
bility of the witness.

SoE AsPEPTS OF REGULATIONS OF FEDERAL REsERVE BOARD AND
STATE STATUTES AUTHORIZING FoRwARDiNG OF CmcKS FOR CoILEcTIOm DIRECT TO DRAwEE BANKS AND ACCEPTANCE OF DRAFTS iN
PAYMENT-The regulations of the Federal Reserve Board author-

ize federal reserve banks in handling checks and other negotiable
instruments forwarded to them for collection to forward them
direct to the banks on which drawn and accept the drawees' drafts
in payment.'
Statutes have been enacted in California, Colorado, Montana and
Oregon authorizing banks doing business in those states to forward
checks and other negotiable instruments received for collection
direct to the2 banks on -which drawn and accept the drawees' drafts
in payment.

These regulations and statutes were enacted
effect of the decision of the Supreme Court of
in the case of Federal Reserve Bank v. Malloy,3
Supreme Court of the United States held that a

to counteract the
the United States
in which case the
former regulation

"Note 6, supra.
2

°See note 11, supra.

*4Carterv. Duluth Yellow Cab Co., (Minn.) 212 N. W 413; see also
Neal v. United States (C. C. A. 8th), 1 F (2d) 637, where the municipal
ordinance cases are discussed and the Washington cases inferentially
criticised.
LRegulation J, Series of 1928, superseding Regulation J, Series of 1924.
2 Laws of California, 1925, c. 312, sec. 5,
Laws of Colorado, 1925, c. 64,
p. 172; Laws of Montana, 1925, c. 63, p. 85, Laws of Oregon, 1925, c. 207,
sec. 126. p. 360.
' 264 U. S. 160, 44 Sup. Ct. 296, 68 L. ed. 617 (1924).

